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Abstract
In this paper, we show that news on future technological improvement can trigger
an immediate economic expansion in a model with nancial friction on capital alloca-
tion. The arrivial of good news on future technology reduces such frictions and generates
signicant increase in current Total Factor Productivity via capital reallocation. This
triggers an immediate boom in output, consumption, investment and hours worked. Our
empirical evidence using rm-level data supports strongly the above mechanisms for news
to aect current aggregate productivity.
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1 Introduction
What drives business cycles? In the Real Business Cycle (RBC hereafter) models, busi-
ness cycles are triggered by TFP (Total Factor Productivity) shocks: an unexpected shift to
TFP leads to a positive comovement of output, consumption, investment and hours worked.
Recent evidence by Beaudry and Portier (2006a), in contrast, shows that news shocks con-
taining information on future TFP changes are potentially an important source of business
cycles. An important nding in their paper is that an anticipated change in future TFP
leads to a boom in output, consumption, investment and hours worked before the actual
technological improvement is realized. Moreover, TFP, as measured by Solow Residual, rises
rapidly in response to a favorable news shock. This nding has invoked a growing number
of studies on "news-driven business cycles" (NDBC hereafter), which contrast the standard
"technology-driven" story in the RBC literature.
This paper shows that these two views can be reconciled in a simple framework with
nancial frictions on capital allocation: good news about future technological opportunities
lead to an increase in the current TFP, which triggers an immediate economic expansion.
The idea is based on the following observations. When good news about future technological
improvement arrive, stock market starts to boom immediately. Projects that are subject
to binding credit constraints are therefore now able to obtain more nancing. This triggers
a reallocation of capital, via merger and acquisition or partial-rm asset transition, from
projects that are not nancially constrained to those with binding nancial constraint. This
reallocation creates an eciency gain, which shows up in the aggregate economy as an upward
shift to current TFP, allowing current output, consumption, investment, and hours worked
to comove positively.
Our work is motivated by microeconomic evidence on the importance of reallocation for
changes in aggregate productivity and the roles of capital reallocation in business cycles.
First, it has been long documented that resource reallocation plays a central role in the
aggregate productivity growth. According to Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Foster,
Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998), the increasing output shares of high productivity plants and
the decreasing output shares of low productivity plants contribute positively to aggregate
productivity growth in all the 23 examined manufacturing industries. Furthermore, as found
by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002), over the 1990s virtually all of the productivity
growth in the U.S. retail trade sector, which lies at the heart of many recent technological
advances such as E-commerce and advanced inventory control, is accounted for by more
productive establishments displacing much less productive establishments.1
1On the productivity-enhancing role at the rm level, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) nd that when both
the purchased and existing assets are taken into account, the change in productivity (measured by TFP) from
the year prior to the asset sale or merger to the end of the second year after the transaction is signicantly
positive for partial-rm assets sales. In addition, gain in productivity for purchased plants is positive related
1
More recent evidence shows that the frictions for reallocation of productive capital across
rms through merger and acquisition and partial-rm asset sales are countercyclical. For
example, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) nd that the correlation of standard deviation of pro-
ductivity dispersion with output is around -0.4.2 The convergence of productivity across
rms during the boom period indicates that capital reallocation at rm level might play an
important role in the aggregate productivity uctuations. Similarly, Maksimovic and Philips
(2001) nd that less productive rms tend to be sold as prospects of the aggregate economy
improve. This suggests that the frictions impeding reallocation are considerably counter-
cyclical. Furthermore, recent evidence by Harford (2005) shows that the observed relation
between economic expansion and capital allocation is essentially driven by an increase in
macro-level capital liquidity and reduction in nancial constraint that is correlated with
high stock market valuation.
Based on the above observations, we introduce nancial frictions on capital reallocation
as our key model ingredient. In our benchmark model, more productive projects are subject
to binding nancial constraints on production scale due to the limited enforcement of debt
payment by entrepreneurs, while the less productive projects are not.3 This friction creates
a gap of marginal productivity of capital between dierent types of projects, and therefore,
the potential eciency gain of reallocating capital from less productive to more productive
projects. The nondefaultness of the debt contract, furthermore, implies that the debt limit
and thus production scale of more productive projects is positively linked to their expected
lifetime prots. The arrival of good news triggers an immediate jump in the lifetime prot of
the more productive projects, and therefore, the value of debt contract for the entrepreneur.
As a result, entrepreneurs have less incentive to default the debt payment. This alleviates
the friction on capital allocation and induces capital to ow from less productive projects
to more productive ones. The capital reallocation reduces gap of marginal productivity
of capital across dierent types of projects and pushes distribution of capital towards the
rst-best. The eciency gain thus generated is shown up as an increase in current TFP.4
We calibrate our model to match the long-run features of U.S. data. Our numerical results
show that following an anticipated future technological improvement, the magnitude of the
initial increase in TFP, which is purely driven by resource reallocation, is about one third
that of the TFP increase when technology improvement is materialized. This eciency gain
leads aggregate output, consumption, investment, and hours worked to comove positively
to the initial dierence in productivity between the buying rm and the purchased rm.
2This negative correlation is robust to adjustment of capital utilization.
3See Barlevy (2003) for discussion on this type of moral hazard problems and the opposite "cleansing
eect".
4Consistent with the empirical ndings, the nancial friction in this context implies countercyclical benets
for capital reallocation.
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together. The business cycle statistics in our model, moreover, are close to the U.S. data.
We then use Compustat and IBES data to test the mechanisms captured in our model for
news shocks to aect current aggregate productivity. In particular, we test the following two
theoretical implications: First, news on individual future protability aect current capital
allocation for rms that are nancially constrained. In contrast, such news have no eect
on impact on capital allocation of rms that are not nancially constrained. Second, during
an economic expansion rms which are nancially constrained acquire more capital than
those that are not. In our model, the rst implication serves as the driving mechanism for
anticipated technological shocks to aect capital allocation, while the second is the key for
capital allocation to increase aggregate productivity. Our empirical results support strongly
both theoretical implications and therefore our story.
Our work is closely related to Jermann and Quadrini (2006a), which show that in a
model with nancial frictions due to limited enforcement of debt, mere prospect of high
future productivity growth can generate sizable gain in current labor productivity. In their
paper, however, nancial frictions are imposed on the investment of new capital goods. This
implies that a relaxation of nancial constraint starts to play a role only after the current
period output is produced. As a result, when the constraint on investment is relaxed, capital
and labor will shift from consumption goods production to investment goods sector, implying
that consumption and investment comove negatively.5 In our model, by contrast, when the
nancial constraint on allocating existing capital across plants is relaxed, projects subject
to binding nancial constraint will be able to augment capital stock before current produc-
tion takes place. This makes it feasible for an immediate expansion of current aggregate
productivity, and therefore, other macro aggregates simultaneously.
Our paper is also related to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the
recent discussion on the role of expectation in triggering business cycle. Beaudry and Portier
(2006b) show that in a wide class of business cycle models mere changes in expectation
about future productivity cannot generate comovement between consumption, investment
and hours worked.6 The reason is simple: without current expansion in output, consumption
and investment will always comove negatively if they substitute one to one with each other.
One potential source for the observed initial response of TFP to news shocks is simply changes
of capital utilization, as argued by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006). However, in the standard
setup with convex investment adjustment costs, investment boom must be associated with
5Beaudry and Portier (2006) have proved that in a two-sector model with constant returns to scale for
production, an increase in investment is necessarily associated with a decrease in consumption or hours worked
or both. Similar proof can be easily extended to two-sector models with decreasing returns to scale in one or
both sectors and nancial frictions on investment goods sector (see, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
6Beaudry and Portier (2004) and Danthine, Donaldson and Johnsen (1998) reach similar conclusions.
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an increase in marginal q, which in fact implies a decline in capital utilization.7 Den Haan
and Kaltenbrunner (2006) argue that labor hoarding may translate into additional resources
for economic expansion when there is matching friction in labor market. Nonetheless, absent
initial productivity increase, either consumption or total investment must decrease in the rst
period, as both capital and employment are predetermined in the period that the news shock
occurs.8 Our work diers from the above studies by exploring the sources of initial expansion
in aggregate output in a framework with heterogeneous projects. Both our theoretical and
empirical results suggest that capital reallocation is an important channel for news to drive
aggregate productivity and business cycles.
Another line of the literature that is closely related to this paper is the role of nancial
market frictions in business cycles. It is well documented in the empirical literature that a
large fraction of rms are nancially constrained. This observation has invoked many theo-
retical works, most of which focus on the role of credit market frictions for the propagation
of cyclical uctuations driven by TFP shocks (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999 for
a literature review).9 By contrast, this paper explores the role of nancial friction in the
transmission of news shocks, and therefore, complements the existing studies on the roles of
nancial frictions for business cycles.
Finally, this paper is related to the recent work on reallocation as source of TFP (e.g.
Restuccia and Rogerson, 2003, Barseghyan and Dicecio, 2006). All these studies, however,
focus on the role of reallocation for the cross-country dierence in long-run TFP, instead of
its role for TFP uctuations over the business cycle.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate the roles of news shock
on TFP uctuations in a simple model without labor. We then extend the economy to
incorporate more realistic features of business cycles in Section 3. Section 4 provides a
discussion of the calibration procedure and the computation method. In Section 5, we
report the impulse responses and business cycle statistics and check the robustness of our
model to alternative parameter values. Section 6 tests the mechanisms in our model for
anticipated shock to aect aggregate productivity using rm-level data. Section 7 concludes.
Appendix contains the denition for recursive competitive equilibrium and the derivation of
the enforcement constraint.
7This holds even if there is an expected investment good specic technological improvement. Only after
such a shock is realized, investment and marginal q can move in opposite directions.
8In addition, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) nd that it is hard to generate expectation-driven
business cycles without norminal fricitons and monetary targeting.
9Another strand of literature focus on the impact of recession on job reallocation. See, among others,
Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), Caballero and Hammour (1994), and Caballero and Hammour (2005).
4
2 A model without labor
In this section, we describe a model that abstract from labor as input in production (referred
to as \economy without labor") to highlight the role of news shock on TFP and business cycle
uctuation via capital reallocation. A full-blown model with richer business cycle ingredients
will be provided in the following section.
Consider an economy with a representative household and a continuum of entrepreneurs
with unit mass. The representative household owns physical capital and decides how much
to consume and how much to invest in physical capital. In addition, the representative
household owns the entitlement, and therefore, the prot of a continuum of projects. The
entrepreneur has access to the technology to operate the project. Each entrepreneur operates
only one project. At each period, the entrepreneurs decide how much capital and labor to
rent from the representative household for prot maximization of the project.10
Projects can be classied into two categories according to whether working capital (or
liquid fund) is needed to pay for the factors of production before production takes place. A
fraction  of projects, denoted as type-h projects, have to pay for the factors of production
with working capital before production takes place.11 The size of working capital required,
denoted as D
 
Kht

, increases with the scale of production, where Kht is the capital deployed
in a type-h project at period t. For the remaining 1    fraction of projects, denoted as
type-l projects, working capital is not necessary.
With probability 1  , projects become unproductive at each period. Once the project
is unproductive, a new project with the same productivity type enters the market and starts
to be operated by a new entrepreneur. This assumption enables the fraction of each type of
projects to be constant over time.
2.1 Project Financing and the Entrepreneur's Problem
To nance the working capital, entrepreneurs of type-h projects borrow from the representa-
tive household at the beginning of each period and repays the debt at the end of the period
after all transactions are completed.12 Because this is a intra-period load, the net interest
10By assuming rental markets as the avenue to allocate existing capital, we abstract from the issue of rm
dynamics in the context of business cycle. Such an abstraction, however, will not aect the qualitative feature
of our model. As will be shown later, the key determinant of aggregate TFP is the distribution of capital
across dierent projects.
11According to Fazzari and Petersen (1993), for rms in fast growing industries, own-rm innovation and
innovation spillovers generate new investment opportunities continuously. This creates a need for working
capital to smooth investment.
12The assumption for enterpreneurs to borrow working capital each period can be rationalized by the fact
that because enterpreneurs become tempted to use excess internal fund ineciently, it is costly for rms to
retain operating cash ows (see Jensen, 1986).
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payment is zero. The ability to borrow, however, is bounded by the limited enforcement
of the debt. At the end of the period, the entrepreneur has the ability to divert the work-
ing capital. Once default, the representative household can take over the control right of
the project from the entrepreneur and recover a fraction (< 1) of the future project value.
The entrepreneur and the representative household can then renegotiate over repayment of
the debt. Appendix 8.1 describes in details the renegotiation process and shows that the
incentive-compatibility condition imposes the following nancial constraint
D

Kht

 V ht+1 = Et
1X
j=1
^
j
ht+j (1)
where V it (i = h; l) is the value of type-i project to the entrepreneur at the end of period t:;
^ =  is the eective discount factor is the subjective discount factor: ht+j is the one-period
prot of type-h project at period t+ j: (1) implies that the entrepreneur can only borrow a
fraction  against the future project value.
The production technology of a type-i, i 2 fh; lg, is given by
Y it = A
i
t
 
Kit

:
where Kit are capital and labor employed in a single type-i project. A
i
t is the productivity
associated with project i, which contains two components.
Ait = 
i
tZt; (2)
The rst part, it, refers to the project-specic productivity. The second part, Zt is an
aggregate technological shock. In this section, we keep project-specic technology it constant
over time and normalized to unity, and assume that aggregate technology Zt is stochastic.
logZt+1 =  logZt + 
Z
t ; (3)
where Zt denotes innovations regarding information on the next period aggregate produc-
tivity Zt+1. Note that the process (3) is dierent from the stochastic technology process in
RBC models: new information on Zt+1 arrives at time t; before Zt+1 is realized. As a result,
next period productivity is perfectly predictable. In contrast, in the RBC models, shocks
occurs at t+ 1; the same time when Zt+1 is realized.
At each period, the entrepreneur of a type-h project chooses capital Kht to solve
max
Kht
Aht

Kht
   (rt + )Kht (4)
subject to (1) :13
13Alternatively, the entrepreneur's problem can be specied as maximizing the present discounted project
prot subject to the sequence of nancial constraints (1) ; by choosing the whole path of capital and labor.
The assumption of rental market for capital, however, makes the choice of capital at each period independent
of the previous allocated capital. Therefore the dynamic problem boils down to the sequence of one-period
prot-maximization problem, as stated in (4)
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The problem of an entrepreneur of a type-l project is
max
Klt
Alt

K lt
   (rt + )K lt (5)
which have the rst order condition
K lt =

Alt
rt + 
 1
1 
(6)
Comparing (1) and (6) ; it is immediate that news about Aht+j aects K
h
t by changing the
tightness of nancial constraint. By contrast, news about Alt+j has no direct impacts on K
l
t
(except through aecting rt). We will use rm-level data to test this implication in Section
6.
2.2 A Decomposition of TFP
To get some intuition of how the aggregate productivity in this economy is determined, we
decompose the aggregate TFP (Total Factor Productivity, measured as \Solow Residual")
as
log TFPt = log
Zt
 
Kht

+ (1  )Zt
 
K lt

Kt
(7)
Accordingly, the percentage deviation of aggregate TFP from its steady state value can be
decomposed as
4 log TFPt = 4 log

Zt

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Zt

K lt
Kt

(8)
Note the right-hand-side (\RHS" hereafter) of (8) can be further decomposed as
4 log

Zt

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Zt

K lt
Kt

= 4 log

Zt

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Zt

K lt
Kt

jZt=Z| {z }
the reallocation eects
+ 4 log

Zt

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Zt

K lt
Kt

jKit
Kt
=K
i
K| {z }
the within-project eects
+ cross product terms (9)
The rst argument on the RHS of (9) is referred to as \the reallocation eect", capturing
the eect of changes in the distribution of capital across projects of dierent types. The
second argument is called \the within-project eects", capturing eect of the exogenous
technological change. Note that even before the aggregate productivity shock is materialized,
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current TFP could increase in response to good news about future technology through the
reallocation eect.
Finally, the representative household's problem is
max
fCt;Kt+1g1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
t
C1 t   1
1  
#
;
subject to
Ct + It = (rt + )Kt + (1  )lt + ht : (10)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It: (11)
2.3 Timing and Information
At each period, the events proceed as follows. At the beginning of each period, news regard-
ing future technological opportunities arrive. At the same time, current-period aggregate
are realized. Then the representative household supplies capital to entrepreneurs. After
consumption goods are produced, the household receives factor payments and prots, and
makes consumption-saving choice. Finally, uncertainty about project survival is revealed.
2.4 Calibration
One period in our model corresponds to one calendar year, the frequency adopted by Eisfeldt
and Rampini (2006) in their measurement of the magnitude of capital reallocation. We set
 = 1; which corresponds to the case of logarithmic utility.  is set to be 0:3 to map into
a capital income share of 0.3. Also, we set  = 0:07 to match the investment capital ratio
in the absence of long run growth in both technology and population.  = 0:96 to match a
steady state real interest rate of 4%. We set the project survival probability  to be 0.90,
which is broadly consistent with the U.S. data for the manufacturing and business service
sector reported by OECD (2001).
For the parameter governing the technology process, we set  = 0:95 to match a quarterly
persistence of 0.987. We let the standard deviation of innovation Z equal to 1:30% such that
the standard deviation of the log of HP detrended TFP simulated from the model (1:25%)
is equal to the corresponding value from annual US data.
Finally,  and  are chosen to target a value of 2 for the ratio of marginal productivity
of capital between 75th- and 25th- percentile projects, which is chosen according to the
ratio of labor productivity between the 75th- and 25th- percentile plants in an industry's
productivity distribution found by Syverson (2004).14 This gives  = 0:5 and  = 0:185:
14As we will show in the next section, in our benchmark economy, the ratio of marginal productivity of
capital between two types projects are equal to the ratio of labor productivity.
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D
 
Kht

is specied as
 
Kht

as a proxy for the production scale or cash ows. Table 1
summarizes the parameter values for this economy.
Table 1. Parameterized Values for Economy w/o Labor
Symbol Denition Value
Technology
 Capital share in production function 0.3
 Project survival rate 0.90
 Depreciation rate for capital 0.07
 Autocorrelation coecient 0.95
Z" Standard deviation of technological innovation 0.013
Z Standard deviation of information innovation 0.013

h
 Standard deviation of information innovation 0.024
Preference
 Discount factor in utility function 0.96
 Coecient of relative risk aversion 1
Market
 Default parameter 0.185
 Fraction of high-tech project 0.50
2.5 Impulse Response to News on Zt
To examine how the economy reacts to news about future productivity, we consider the
following experiment: at period 0, the economy is at steady state. At the beginning of period
1, all agents receive unanticipated news that the economy-wide productivity Z will increase
by one percent in period 2. At the beginning of period 2, the technology improvement is
materialized. Our choice of one period as the lag for technological improvement to be realized
is motivated by Beaudry and Portier (2006a), which evidence suggests that a permanent
change in TFP may be associated with an up to 10 quarters long period where there may
be no actual change in technological opportunities.15
Figure 1 plots the impulse responses for this economy to the news shock. We see that in
response to news on productivity increase at period 2, aggregate output, consumption, and
investment all goes up at period 1.16 Moreover, consistent with Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006),
15The results remain qualitatively the same if we assume that an anticipated shock is realized at period 3.
Our choice of one year as the lag for actual technological improvement to be materialized greatly eases the
computation burden to solve for the policy functions.
16Note that the impulse response of output is hump-shaped even after the technology is realized. This is
well consistent with the nding of Cogley and Nason (1995). The reason for this hump-shape response is that
reallocation eects keep contributing to the increase in TFP even after the technology shock is realized.
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nancial friction of capital reallocation, as measured by the ratio of marginal productivity
of capital between two types of projects is countercyclical.
The reason for the comovement of macro aggregates, as implied by Figure 2, is that
aggregate TFP shifts up in response to the news shock. The decomposition of TFP shows
that before actual technology realized, all TFP increase at period 1 is accounted for by the
increase in reallocation eect.
In summary, we show that in a simple model with nancial friction on capital reallocation
alone, news on future technological improvement may trigger a reallocation of capital. Such
redistribution of capital generates eciency gain in the current period, shown up as an
increase in TFP in aggregate economy. The increase in TFP could then make it feasible for
comovement of macro aggregates, before the actual technology shock is realized.
3 A full-blown model
To compare our model's performance with the data, we now extend the above model to
incorporate the following more realistic ingredients: heterogeneity in productive eciency,
nancial friction on resource reallocation (including both capital and labor), convex invest-
ment adjustment cost, and endogenous labor supply. We call this economy the \benchmark
economy".
We assume that projects are also dierentiated by the expected eciency of their produc-
tion technologies.17 Specically, A fraction  of projects have higher expected productivity,
denoted as type-h or high-tech projects. Similarly, denote the remaining 1    fraction of
projects as type-l or low-tech projects. The production technology of a type-i, i 2 fh; lg, is
given by
Y it = A
i
t
 
Kit
  
H it
1 
:
where Kit and H
i
t are capital and labor employed in a single type-i project.  < 1, implying
decreasing returns to scale.18 The magnitude of  captures the \span of control" of the
entrepreneur, as mentioned by Lucas (1978). Ait is the productivity associated with project
i, which contains three components.
Ait = (1 + )
t itZt; (12)
17As surveyed by Bartelsman and Doms (2000), micro studies have consistently found that there is sizable
dispersion in plant-level productivity within narrowly dened U.S. manufacturing industries. The ratio of
average TFP for plants in the ninth decile of the productivity distribution relative to the average in the second
decile was about 2 to 1 in 1972 and about 2.75 to 1 in 1987. Moreover, more than one-third of the plants
remain in the same productivity quantile after ve years (see Bartelsman and Dhrymes, 1998), indicating
that productivity gaps among plants are quite persistent.
18Basu and Fernald (1997) estimate returns to scale using data on 34 industries and nd that without
correcting for aggregation, returns to scale appear strongly diminishing.
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The rst part, (1 + )t, captures the trend of technology, where  is the long-run growth
rate of aggregate productivity. The second and the third parts, it and Zt, respectively, refer
to the project-specic productivity and aggregate technology. As a benchmark, we keep
project-specic productivity it+1 constant over time and equal to 
i , with h > l. The
specication for news shocks on aggregate productivity is the same as that in (3) :
We assume again the operation of a type-h project requires an amount of working
capital, which magnitude increases in the production scale.1920 Entrepreneurs of type-h
projects face the same limited enforcement problem of debt repayment as those in the
model without labor. For reasons discussed below, the divertible resource is specied as
D
 
Kht ;H
h
t

=
 
Kht
  
Hht
1 
. Similar to the model without labor, the incentive-
compatibility condition imposes the following nancial constraint
D

Kht ;H
h
t

 V ht = Et
1X
j=1
()j ht+j : (13)
At each period, the entrepreneur of a type-h project chooses capital Kht ; labor H
h
t to solve
max
fKht ;Hht g
Aht

Kht
 
Hht
1    (rt + )Kht   wtHht (14)
subject to (13) : The problem of an entrepreneur of a type-l project is
max
fKl;Hltg
Alt

K lt
 
H lt
1    (rt + )K lt   wtH lt
The rst-order conditions of the entrepreneur's problem implies the following allocation of
capital between the two types of projects


Kht
 1 
Hht
(1 ) 
Aht   ht

= 

K lt
 1 
H lt
(1 )
Alt
= rt + : (15)
where ht is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the nancial constraint (13). To get
the intuition for (15), note that at the rst best allocation, where the nancial constraint is
not binding (ht = 0), type-h project should be allocated with more capital until the marginal
19Barlevy (2003) nds that empirically rms with higher output per worker tend to borrow more (after
controlling for net worth), suggesting that they are more vulnerable to credit constraints.
20In addition, Carpenter and Peterson (2002) argue that highly variable returns, aysmmetric information
and a lack of collateral may cause high-tech rms to have poor access to debt. To support this arguement,
they found that many small high-tech rms in Compustat database obtain little debt nancing.
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productivity of capital, denoted as MPK; between the two types of projects are the same.
Similarly, the allocation of labor follows
(1  )

Kht
 
Hht
(1 ) 1 
Aht   ht

= (1  )

K lt
 
H lt
(1 ) 1
Alt
= wt: (16)
Our specication of default value gives rise to the following properties: capital-labor ratios
in both types of projects are the same, independent of the production scale.
Kht
Hht
=
K lt
H lt
=
wt
(1  ) (rt + ) :
This shuts down the within-project resource misallocation (between capital and labor) as
a potential source for productivity gain and allows us to focus on the eect of resource
reallocation between projects on aggregate productivity. Finally, it is easy to shows that
given the relative magnitude of production eciency of these two technologies, the rst best
allocation of capital follows
Kht
K lt
=

Aht
Alt
 1
1 
: (17)
3.1 A Decomposition of TFP
We assume the labor income share is correctly measured, that is (1  ) = 1  b: We then
decompose the aggregate TFP (Total Factor Productivity, measured as \Solow Residual")
as
log TFPt = log
P
iA
i
t
 
Kit
  
H it
1 
K
b
t H
1 b
t
(18)
= log
P
iA
i
t
 
Kit=H
i
t
( 1)  
Kit

(Kt=Ht)
b 1Kt
= (  1) logKt + log
X
i
Ait

Kit
Kt

The rst term on the right hand side of (18) is a level eect: given decreasing returns to
scale, larger average scales reduce aggregate productivity. The second term is the sum of the
project-specic technology weighted by the share of capital in each type of project, which
we call \adjusted Solow Residual". Accordingly, the percentage deviation of aggregate TFP
from its balanced growth path can be decomposed as
4 log TFPt = 4 log
 
Aht
 
Kht

+ (1  )Alt
 
K lt

Kt
!
= (  1)4 logKt +4 log

Aht

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Alt

K lt
Kt

(19)
12
where the percentage change of \adjusted Solow Residual" can be further decomposed as
4 log

Aht

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Alt

K lt
Kt

= 4 log

Aht

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Alt

K lt
Kt

jZt=Z| {z }
the reallocation eects
+4 log

Aht

Kht
Kt

+ (1  )Alt

K lt
Kt

jKit
Kt
=K
i
K| {z }
the within-project eects
+ cross product term (20)
Again, the rst and second arguments on the right-hand-side of (20) are the \reallocation
eect" and the \within-project eect", which bear similar meanings as their counterparts in
the economy without labor. Note that before the aggregate productivity shock is material-
ized, the change of \adjusted Solow Residual" (and the initial change in aggregate TFP) is
purely due to the reallocation eect.
3.2 Household Sector
There is a stand-in household with Nt working-age members at date t. The size of the
household evolves over time exogenously at a constant rate n = Nt=Nt 1 1. The household
values both consumption and leisure. In addition, investment in capital is subject to a
quadratic adjustment cost. In this framework a representative household solves
max
fct;;Ht;kt+1g1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
tNtu (ct; ht)
#
;
subject to
Ct +G (It;Kt) = (rt + )Kt + wtHt + (1  )lt + ht ; (21)
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It; (22)
G (It;Kt) = It + 

It
Kt
     n  gy
2
Kt: (23)
where ct = Ct=Nt is per member consumption, ht = Ht=Nt is the fraction of hours worked
per member of the household, Ht is total hours worked by all working-age members of the
household, and Kt is the capital stock owned by the household at the beginning of period t.
gy is the growth rate of output per capita at the balanced growth path, which follows
1 + gy = (1 + )
1
1  (1 + n)
 1
1 
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The rst order conditions implies the following standard equations
uc (ct; ht)wt =  uh (ct; ht) (24)
qt = 1 + 2

It
Kt
     n  gy

(25)
qtuc (ct; ht) = Et
24uc (ct+1; ht+1)
0@ rt +  + 2 ItKt      n  gy ItKt    ItKt      n  gy2
+qt+1 (1  )
1A35(26)
where qt is the marginal q, ux (ct; ht) is the marginal utility (or disutility) associated with
x; x = c or h: Equation (24) is the rst order condition for labor. Equation (25) is the
rst order condition for investment, and Equation (26) is the standard Euler equation with
quadratic adjustment cost.
Finally, we keep the timing and information structures the same as those in the economy
without labor.
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of an allocation fct; htg1t=0 for the rep-
resentative household, allocation fKht ;Hht ;K lt;H lt ;Kt;Ht; Ytg1t=0 for entrepreneurs and price
system fwt; rtg such that
 Given prices, the allocation solves the household's problem (21).
 Given prices, the allocation solves the entrepreneur's prot maximization problem (14).
 Capital market clears: Kht + (1  )K lt = Kt
 Labor market clears: Hht + (1  )H lt = Ht
 Good market clears:
Ct +G (It;Kt) = Yt
= Aht

Kht
 
Hht
1 
+ (1  )Alt

K lt
 
H lt
1 
:
For numerical simulation, we also dene the recursive competitive equilibrium in the
Appendix. We solve for the decision rules by policy function iterations.
4 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model economy using data from the 2005 revision of National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) to target the average values of U.S. data over the
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1960-2004 period. Our measure of capital stock includes government capital and stock of
consumer durables, following Cooley and Prescott (1995). Again, one period in the model
corresponds to one calendar year.
4.1 Preference
In our baseline experiment, the period utility of the household follows the utility specication
in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Homan (1988) (\GHH" hereafter).
u(ct; ht) =

ct    At h
1+
t
1+
1 
  1
1   (27)
where At = (1 + gy)
t is incorporated in the utility to ensure the stationarity of hours on
the balanced growth path. Under GHH preference, the intertemporal substitution eect on
labor supply is shut down. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006) use a preference that nests both the
GHH form and that used by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) (\KPR" hereafter), and nd
that to achieve comovement between consumption and hours worked, the preference must
be very close to the GHH form.
We set  to 0.4 to match a Frisch elasticity of 2.5. The parameter  is set to 1.5 so that
the hours worked is 0.31 at the steady state. The discount factor  is set to 0.979, implying
a steady state real interest rate of 4%. The population growth rate n is set to 0.0147, which
is the average growth rate of civilian population aged 16-64 between 1960 and 2004.
4.2 Technology
We set gy = 0:0183, which is consistent with the long-run average growth rate of U.S. real
GNP per capita.  is set to 0:85, the value used by Atkeson and Kehoe (2001). The parameter
 is then set so that the labor income share is 0.6. This yields a value of  of 0.294. The
depreciation rate  is set to match an investment capital ratio of 0.074, the average between
1960 and 2004. This gives  = 0:04. The adjustment cost parameter, , is set to 2.0, which
is close to the estimated result by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
We normalize the expected detrended value of technology at low-tech project l to 1:To
calibrate h; the expected productivity of the high-tech projects and , the collateral ratio,
we use the fact that at steady state,
 =
1
h(1+gy)
  1
h

1  =

yh=nh
yl=nl
 :
Therefore, we set the values of h and  simultaneously to match two targets, the ratio of
labor productivity between the two types of projects and an aggregate capital-output ratio
of 2.5. Typically, the ratio of the labor productivity of the 25 percentile producer to the 75th
15
percentile producer is about 2 (see Bartelman and Doms, 2001 for a survey of the empirical
literature and Syverson, 2004, Table 1.) The fact that in our model economy the number
of high-tech projects and low tech projects are set to be equal in our economy, accordingly,
implies y
h=nh
yl=nl
= 2: As a result, h = 1:69 and  = 0:13: This implies a value of 0.26 for the
standard deviation of logi, which is well within the range estimated in the literature.21
For all other parameters, the calibration procedure follows the calibration in the economy
without labor. Table 2 summarizes the calibrated parameters.
Table 2. Parameter Values For the Benchmark Economy
Symbol Denition Value
Demographics
n Population growth rate 0.015
Technology
 Capital share in production function 0.294
gy Growth rate of output per capita 0.018
 Project survival rate 0.90
 Depreciation rate for capital 0.04
h Expected high-tech project-specic productivity 1.69
 Production parameter 0.85
 Autocorrelation coecient 0.95
Z Standard deviation of information innovation 0.013
 Adjustment cost parameter 2.0
Preference
 Discount factor in utility function 0.979
 Disutility parameter for leisure 1.6
 Coecient of relative risk aversion 1
 Inverse of Frisch elasticity 0.4
Market
 Default parameter 0.13
 Fraction of high-tech projects 0.50
5 Results
In this section, we rst plot the impulse responses of macro aggregate to news on future
technological improvements. We then report the business cycle statistics under the news
shocks. Finally, we check the robustness of our results to dierent parameter values.
21Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) specify a log AR(1) process for the plant-specic shock and obtained a
value of 0.64 for the estimated standard deviation.
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5.1 Impulse Response to News
Our key question is whether news shocks can trigger comovement of output, consumption,
investment, and hours. To this end, we study the impulse responses to anticipated future
technological improvement. In the baseline case, the economy is subjective to news shocks on
aggregate technological improvement. In order to unravel the underlying propagation mech-
anism, we also study the impulse responses to news shocks on technological improvement
specic to high-tech projects.
5.1.1 Impulse Response to News on the Economy-Wide Productivity Zt
Figure 3 plots the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to this news shock. Though
the exogenous technology improvement materializes at period 2, the economy starts an ex-
pansion at period 1. Consumption, investment, output and hours worked all increases in
period 1. As one can see from the rst two column of Table 3, the eects of such a news
shock are sizable: output, consumption and investment increase by 0:52%, 0:54% and 0:46%,
respectively. The change of hours is not signicant, however.
Table 3. Response to News
Z Ah
t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
Y 0:52 2:10 0:72 1:10
C 0:54 1:82 0:81 1:02
I 0:46 3:38 0:30 1:47
H 0:16 1:36 0:22 0:21
~K 0:63 0:40 0:87 0:83
TFP 0:43 1:26 0:59 0:96
The reason for the comovement of macro aggregates, as mentioned earlier, is the increase
in total factor productivity brought by the reallocation of capital from low-tech projects to
high-tech projects. This is evident in Figure 4. Figure 4 depicts the response of capital real-
location, together with the benet of reallocating capital, measured by the ratio of marginal
productivity to capital between the two types of projects.
MPKht
MPK lt
=

Kht
K lt
 1
Aht
Alt

(28)
The bottom panels of Figure 4 shows that when good news arrive, capital (and labor) is
reallocated from low-tech projects to high tech projects. As in the upper right panel, the
magnitude of capital reallocation on impact is 0.6 percent of capital stock, somewhat below
that is estimated by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006). Accordingly, we see from the upper-left
panel that the gap of marginal productivity between the two types of projects decreases.
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Figure 5 and 6 plot the response of TFP and its components to the good news. In Figure
5, we see that the level eect plays a minor role in the change of TFP, especially during the
initial periods. The initial response of TFP amounts to 0:43% (Table 3), which is one third
of the magnitude of TFP increase when technology improvement is realized. Figure 6 shows
that reallocation eects explain all the increase in TFP before the shock is materialized.
After the technology improvement is realized, the contribution of capital reallocation to
TFP starts to decline.
5.1.2 Impulse Response to News on the Project-Specic Productivity ht
The U.S. boom in the 90s is largely fueled by optimism of a New Economy, represented by
technological breakthrough in computer sector and its wide usage in other sectors. There-
fore, it is interesting to explore the eect of news on high-tech project specic technology,
controlling for economy-wide productivity shocks.
Accordingly, we consider news shocks on project-specic productivity (29). Specically,
we let Zt and 
l
t remain constant (equal to their mean) and assume that
loght+1 = (1  ) logh +  loght + 
h
t ; (29)
where 
h
t denotes information innovations on the next period productivity 
h
t+1. Here again,
we assume that the next period productivity is perfectly predictable: households receive a
perfect signal on the future productivity innovation.
We set  = :95; the value used in our benchmark case. We then choose 
h
 such that
the standard deviation of the log of HP detrended TFP simulated from the model (1:25%)
is equal to the corresponding value from annual US data. The calibrated 
h
 is equal to
2:40%.
The experiment is similar as before: at period 0, the economy is at steady state. At
the beginning of period 1, all agents received unanticipated news that ht will increase by
one percent from period 2. At the beginning of period 2, the technology improvement is
materialized. The results can be seen from Figure 7 to 10.
Although the dynamics looks qualitatively similar, the initial response of macroeconomic
variables to such news on project-specic technological improve is considerably larger than
the initial response to news shocks on the economy-wide technology (see the two right
columns of Table 3). The expectation drives the initial output by 0:72%, more than 2=3
of the output increase to the realized technological shock at period 2. The initial response
of TFP is also remarkable: it increases nearly 0:60%. The intuition for the amplied eect
of news shock on future Ah is straightforward. Given lt unchanged, high-tech projects are
more easy to get nanced in future. This implies a larger value of high-tech projects, which
relaxes further the nancial constraint and thus induces more resource to ow from low-tech
projects to high-tech projects. Hence, capital reallocation in response to news shocks on ht
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(0:87%) turns out to be more active than capital reallocation in response to news shocks on
z (0:63%), resulting in a larger eciency gain as reected by the response of TFP.
5.2 Business Cycle Statistics
We would like to know how our model performs in other dimensions of business cycles. We
compare with the U.S. data the business cycle statistics under the above mentioned two
dierent specications for technological process as in (3) and (29). To simulate the economy,
we rst use the quadrature method described in Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to construct a
three-state Markov chain that approximates the autocorrelation in the AR(1) process. The
estimated transition matrix is
 =
264 0:8099 0:1874 0:00270:1667 0:6667 0:1667
0:0027 0:1874 0:8099
375 ; (30)
and the supports for the estimated Markov chains of (3) and (29) are equal to f0:031; 0; 0:031g
and f0:057; 0; 0:057g, respectively. We then simulate the economy 500 times, each contain-
ing 45 periods. The sample mean of the standard deviation of macro variables are reported
in Table 4, together with the U.S. data.
Table 4. Volatility of Macro Variables
Data Model Specications
News to Zt News to 
h
t
Used for calibration
the standard deviation of TFP 0:0125 0:0127 0:0126
Not used for calibration
the standard deviation of output 0:0173 0:0220 0:0127
the standard deviation of consumption 0:0120 0:0179 0:0095
the standard deviation of investment 0:0597 0:0402 0:0294
the standard deviation of hours 0:0154 0:0162 0:0016
We rst examine news shocks on the aggregate productivity Zt. The results are reported
in the middle column of Table 4. Note that the implied standard deviation for the log of
output is equal to 2.2%, larger than the corresponding value for U.S. data (1.73%). Dierent
from our model, the standard RBCmodels imply less volatile output than data. This suggests
that nancial frictions enhance the propagation of technological shocks, as pointed out by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), among many others. The generated volatilities of consumption
and investment have the standard ordering: consumption is less volatile and investment is
more volatile relative to output. The volatility of hours implied by the model is almost the
same as data.
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The results implied by the news shocks to ht is given in the right column of Table 4. Not
surprisingly, the volatilities fall sharply, since low-tech projects are immune of technological
shocks. The decline of the volatility of hours is the most remarkable. Recall that wage
rate is determined by the marginal labor productivity of low-tech projects. The constant
productivity lt thus implies rather stable wage rate and labor supply over business cycles.
Table 5. Cross-Correlation Table
t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
Data
correlation(Y,Y) -0.0214 0.5565 1.0000 0.5527 -0.0463
correlation(C,Y) -0.1948 0.3038 0.7186 0.7153 0.4458
correlation(I,Y) 0.2357 0.6444 0.8540 0.1967 -0.4495
correlation(H,Y) 0.0316 0.5168 0.9343 0.5049 -0.1705
correlation(TFP,Y) 0.4162 0.6279 0.4099 -0.3638 -0.6303
News on Zt
correlation(Y,Y) 0.0377 0.4490 1.0000 0.4529 0.0385
correlation(C,Y) 0.0276 0.4510 0.9996 0.4659 0.0563
correlation(I,Y) 0.0578 0.4440 0.9982 0.4260 0.0030
correlation(H,Y) 0.0120 0.3959 0.9982 0.4677 0.0563
correlation(TFP,Y) 0.1349 0.5396 0.9835 0.3544 -0.0792
News on ht
correlation(Y,Y) 0.0835 0.6223 1.0000 0.6249 0.0867
correlation(C,Y) 0.1246 0.7366 0.9778 0.5519 0.0664
correlation(I,Y) 0.0202 0.4160 0.9558 0.6825 0.1119
correlation(H,Y) -0.0082 0.6866 0.6295 0.3863 0.2833
correlation(TFP,Y) 0.1514 0.6367 0.9892 0.5627 -0.0162
The cross correlation matrix is reported in Table 5. A prominent feature is that under
both types of news shocks, all macro variables are highly procyclical, consistent with the
stylized facts of U.S. business cycles. Of course, quantitatively, our news shock models
overestimate the current correlation coecients, similar to RBC model.
Also interesting is the correlation coecients between output and TFP. In the U.S.
data, TFP leads output by one year. An interpretation of this leading behavior in the
RBC model is that output peaks several quarters after the economy is hit by the technology
shock, indicating there exist some mechanism that propagate the technology shocks. Though
under either shock the model generates a comovement of output and TFP, the one-period
leading correlation coecient for TFP is actually higher than the corresponding one-period
lagging correlation coecient. The reason, as we mentioned before, is that reallocation eect
contributes more to aggregate TFP increase at the initial stages of economic expansion than
later on.
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5.3 Robustness
In our benchmark model with parameter calibrated to U.S. data, news about future rises in
Zt+1 or 
h
t+1 triggers an expansion of output, consumption, investment and hours. Moreover,
TFP and stock prices also increase before the actual rise in Zt+1 or 
h
t+1. This is consistent
with all empirical aspects of expectation-driven business cycles found in Beaudry and Portier
(2006). In this subsection, we use dierent parameterization to check the robustness. We
focus on the adjustment cost coecient , the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution  and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity , since these parameters values are not
calibrated but simply borrow from the literature. The possible ranges of parameter values
which can generate expectation-driven business cycles are given in Table 6.
Table 6. Combination of Parameter Values that Generate NDBC
  
News Shock to Zt (0:13;1) (0:11; 1:48) (0;1)
News Shock to ht (0;1) (0; 2:95) (0;1)
For news shock to Zt, the adjustment cost coecient  has to be larger than 0:13, which
is lower than the lowest estimate 0:20 in the literature (see Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006).
Capital adjustment costs help investment to comove with output and consumption with a
news shock. To see this, consider a news shock that predicts technological improvement in
the future. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  were very large, agents would
increase consumption substantially for consumption smoothing, resulting in a decline of
investment. However, this would not occur with suciently large adjustment costs, since
otherwise agents would have to pay large adjustment costs for increasing investment as the
technological shift materializes.
To have the comovement of consumption and investment,  has to fall into the range
of (0:11; 1:48) under the benchmark parameterization. If  is too small, consumption will
decline in the rst period due to the very large intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
One the other hand, if  is too large, the desire for consumption smoothing is too strong,
resulting in the large initial response of consumption to a news shock, which forces investment
to decline. This also implies that larger capital adjustment costs tend to relax the upper
bound of . In fact, if we raise the adjustment cost coecient to 5, a value within the
range estimated by the literature (see Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006), the upper bound of
 increases to 1:91. The Frisch elasticity turns out to be irrelevant.
The conditions for comovement are substantially relaxed when news shocks are project-
specic. Under benchmark parameterization, business cycles can be triggered by expecta-
tions in an economy without capital adjustment costs. The upper bound of  also increase
to 2:95.
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6 Empirical Evidence
Our theory has the following testable implications: news on individual rm's future prof-
itability can aect current capital allocation for those that are nancially constrained. In
contrast, such news have no eect on impact on capital allocation for those that are not
nancially constrained, since the capital deployed in those rms can only be aected by the
current level of productivity: This section provides evidence supporting the prediction, and
thus the fundamental mechanism in our model for news shocks to aect capital allocation.
6.1 Data
One of the major diculties in testing the rst prediction is how to distinguish rms that
are nancially constrained. We use an index constructed by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo
(2001), which is based on work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), to measure the likelihood of
a rm to be nancial constrained. Denote it as KZ index.
KZ is a weighted average of a rm-year's cash ow, cash dividends, cash balances,
leverage and rm's average Q, with negative weights on the rst three and positive ones
on the last two. These weights are obtained by estimation of ordered logit models of the
probability that a rm falls in one of the ve categories: (1) not nancially constrained; (2)
likely not to be nancially constrained; (3) dicult to classify as either constrained or not;
(4) likely to be nancially constrained; (5) undoubtedly to be nancially constrained.22 A
higher KZ therefore implies a higher possibility of being nancially constrained. The KZ
index has been adapted in some recent empirical work by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo
(2001) and Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003). In particular, Baker et al. (2003) found that
the investment of rms with larger KZ is more sensitive in response of Q. We will borrow
the empirical strategy of Baker et al. (2003), with a focus on the impact of expectations on
acquisition (rather than the impact of Q on investment).
Expectation data are from the IBES database. IBES asks analysts to provide forecasts of
earnings for each rm in the database. There are three variables on expectations; one- and
two-year-ahead forecasts for earning per share, and the long-term growth forecast (LTG)
representing an expected annual increase in earnings over the next business cycle (a period
over the next three to ve years). \When calculating their forecasts of long-term growth,
IBES instructs analysts to ignore the current state of the business cycle and to project,
instead, the expected trend growth of the company's earnings. Thus, the long-term growth
forecasts should contain information not in the one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead forecasts,
22See Kaplan and Zingales (1997) for details on how to classify the rm-years into these ve category based
on both objective and subjective criteria. Since rm's average Q is closely related to expected future prots,
we use a four-variable version of the index which omits average Q (see also Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003).
Using the original index does not change our main results.
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which necessarily will be aected by current conditions." (Cummins et al., 2006, pp. 799)
Therefore, the long-term growth forecast (LTG), by the instruction of IBES, is orthogonal
to the current state, and thus can be used as a proxy for \news" in our model. We use the
mean of LTG across analysts.23
Firm-level data on capital reallocation and variables used to construct KZ index are
from Compustat database. We measure the size of capital reallocation (CR) as acquisition
(Compustat Annual Item 129) minus sale of property, plant and equipment (Item 107).
Following Baker et al. (2003), we exclude nancial rms (i.e., rms with a one-digit SIC of
six) and rm-years with a book value under $10 million, but includes all observations with
data on capital reallocation and KZ index.
The combination of Compustat and IBES databases results in a unbalanced panel which
covers the period between 1981 and 2005.24 The full sample includes 43722 observations,
for an average of 1749 observations per year. We use CRit=A
i
t 1 as the scaled measure of
capital reallocation, where A denotes book assets (Compustat Annual Item 6). To reduce the
inuence of outliers, we Winsorize each of the variables used at the rst and ninety-ninth
percentile; i.e., we set all variables beyond these tolerances to the rst and ninety-ninth
percentile values, respectively. Our results upholds qualitatively without Winsorizing the
data.25 Table 7 reports summary statistics for CRit=A
i
t 1, LTGit and KZit .
Table 7. Summary Statistics
mean SD max min
CRit=A
i
t 1 0.0320 0.1152 0.7432 -0.1354
LTGit 19.9398 11.8883 70.0000 1.97
KZit 0.0518 1.5240 4.5764 -10.6466
6.2 Empirical Results
We apply the method of Baker et al. (2003). All rms in the sample data are classied into
quintiles according to their mean value of KZit over the full sample period.
26 For each KZ
quintile, we estimate
CRit
Ait 1
= ai + at + b  LTGit + uit; (31)
where ai and at are rm dummies and year dummies, respectively. Note that LTG
i
t is by
denition uncorrelated to uit. The rst hypothesis predicts that the estimated coecient b
23Using the median value of LTG, as recommended by IBES, gives similar results.
24The appendix provides details for how to merge Compustat and IBES databases.
25We Winsorize the indredients of the KZ index before constructing it.
26Using the median value of KZit gives similar results.
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should be statistically insignicant for rms in lowerKZ quintiles, while signicantly positive
for rms in higher KZ quintiles.
Table 8 presents the results. As predicted by the theory, the estimates of b are not
signicantly dierent from zero for the rst and second quintiles, but positive and highly
signicant for the third to fth quintiles. Moreover, there is a strong relationship between
KZ and the eect of long-term growth forecasts on capital reallocation. The coecient b
rises monotonically from 0:0007 in the third quintile to 0:0015 in the top quintile, suggesting
that the rms that are more likely to be nancially constrained have a stronger sensitivity of
capital reallocation to long-term expectations than rms that are less likely to be nancially
constrained.
Table 8. Expectation and Capital Reallocation
KZ index b Obs. Adj. R2
Quintile 1 0:0001
(0:0001)
8744 0:2828
2 0:0001
(0:0001)
8730 0:1563
3 0:0007
(0:0002)
8759 0:1783
4 0:0010
(0:0002)
8744 0:2258
5 0:0015
(0:0003)
8745 0:2588
Note:  stands for is signicant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
We use the mean value of KZit over the full sample period to measure the likelihood for
each rm to be nancially constrained. A key issue is whether the likelihood varies over time.
As a robustness check, we classify rms based on their ve-year mean value of KZit and run
the same panel regression (31) for each KZ quintile. Column (1) of Table 9 shows that our
main results uphold. In Column (2), we add a discounted sum of one- and two-year-ahead
earnings forecasts to the regression as a control variable.27 As a further check, we add cash
ow over Ait 1 (Compustat Annual Item 14 + Item 18) as an additional control variable in
Column (3). The results are essentially the same and the estimates of b for each quintile are
rather stable across dierent specications.
Table 9. Robustness Check
27We multiply the one- and two-year-ahead earning forecasts per share by the number of shares outstanding
to yield forecasts of future earning levels. We use a discount rate of 0:91, as in Cummins et al. (2006).
However, the results are insensitive to the value of discount rate.
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KZ index (1) (2) (3) (4)
Quintile 1 0:0000
(0:0002)
0:0001
(0:0001)
0:0000
(0:0001)
0:0064
(0:0017)
2  0:0000
(0:0002)
 0:0002
(0:0002)
 0:0002
(0:0002)
0:0098
(0:0023)
3 0:0003
(0:0002)
0:0005
(0:0002)
0:0005
(0:0002)
0:0169
(0:0038)
4 0:0008
(0:0002)
0:0007
(0:0002)
0:0008
(0:0002)
0:0338
(0:0048)
5 0:0013
(0:0003)
0:0014
(0:0003)
0:0013
(0:0003)
0:0498
(0:0074)
Note:  and  stands for is signicant at 1% and 5%, respectively. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. In Column (1), we classify rms based on their ve-year mean value ofKZit . In Column
(2), we add a discounted sum of one- and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts as a control variable.
In Column (3), we further add cash ow over Ait 1 as an additional control variable to the control
variable in Column (2). We replace LTG with the long-run real Q in Cummins et al. (1999).
Finally, we replace LTG with "long-run real Q" constructed by the way proposed in
Cummins et al. (2006). The long-run real Q computes the two-year-ahead expected market
value for each rm according to two-year-ahead earning forecasts as well as the long-term
growth forecasts LTG. One-year-ahead earning forecasts are excluded since they are most
likely aected by the current state of the economy. Column (4) of Table 9 shows that the
estimates of b now become positive and highly signicant for each quintile. This is not
surprising; the estimates of b is biased upwards since two-year-ahead earning forecasts are
also likely correlated to uit. However, there is a strong relationship between KZ and the
eect of expected market value on capital reallocation. The coecient b rises monotonically
from 0:0064 in the bottom quintile to 0:0498 in the top quintile.
6.3 Aggregate Implications
The above micro-level empirical nding delivers an important macro-level implication; rms
that are nancially constrained acquire more capital in boom periods than rms that are
not. The opposite is true for the recessions.28 Put dierently, we should observe that capital
reallocation for rms that are nancially constrained are more volatile along the business
cycles. In our model, this macro-level implication is the prerequisite for capital allocation to
increase aggregate productivity in boom periods.
We use CRJt  1NJ
P
i2KZJ CR
i
t to measure the average size of capital reallocation for
rms whose mean value of KZit over the full sample period belongs to the J-th quintile,
where NJ refers to the number of rms in the J-th quintile. dCRJt is the cyclical part of CRJt
28In boom periods, LTGit on average are better than those in the recessions. For instance, the mean of
LTGit across rms during 1997 and 2000 is 23:71, much higher than that of 17:57 in the period during 1991
and 1994.
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by HP lter. Compustat started to record acquisition (item 129) since 1971. Therefore, we
have data on dCRJt from 1971 to 2005. Figure 11 plots dCR1t , dCR5t (i.e. the sizes of total
acquisition by rms in the bottom and top (mean) KZ quintiles, respectively), and the HP
ltered GDP of the U.S., denoted by\GNP t: Note that the sizes of capital reallocation before
1980 recorded by Compustat are much smaller than those afterwards. It is obvious in Figure
11 that after 1980, while both ofdCR1t anddCR5t are procyclical, capital reallocation for rms
in the top KZ quintile is much more volatile than that by rms in the bottom quintile.
[Insert Figure 11]
Table 10 shows that standard deviation of dCRJt is monotonically increasing in J . The
increase of volatility is sizable: the variance of dCR5t is more than two times larger than the
variance of dCR1t . Due to the sizes of capital reallocation in Compustat, one may suspect
that capital reallocation has much smaller eect on business cycles before 1980. For this
concern, we also report results for the subperiod since 1981. The main ndings are still
there. This evidence strongly supports the mechanism for capital reallocation to aect
aggregate productivity captured by our model.
Table 10. Financial Constraint and Standard Deviation of Capital Reallocation
Full Sample (1971-2005) Subsample (1981-2005)dCR1 0.0054 0.0063dCR2 0.0054 0.0062dCR3 0.0068 0.0079dCR4 0.0087 0.0101dCR5 0.0117 0.0135
.
7 Conclusion
We show that good news on future technological improvement generate an immediate ex-
pansion in output, consumption, hours and investment. The key element in our model is
nancial friction on allocating capital, which generates a gap of marginal productivity of
capital across dierent types of projects. The arrival of goods news on future technology
reduces the nancial friction and triggers capital to reallocate from projects that are not
nancially constrained to those for which the constraints are binding. This reduces the gap
of marginal productivity of capital and pushes the distribution of capital toward the rst
best. The eciency gains created by this reallocation show up in the aggregate economy
as an upward shift to current TFP, and lead output, consumption, investment, and hours
worked to comove positively.
Furthermore, our empirical evidence based on Compustat data provides direct support for
our theory. In particular, we nd that in a broad sample of rms recorded in both Compustat
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and IBES database, news on individual future protability have signicant impact on current
capital allocation of rms that are nancially constrained, while the impact is insignicant
for those that are not nancially constrained. Furthermore, acquisitions by rms that are
nancially constrained are more volatile along the business cycles. These ndings strongly
support the mechanism captured in our model for news on future technological improvement
to aect current aggregate productivity and other macro aggregates.
8 Appendix
8.1 Denition of Recursive Competitive Equilibrium for Benchmark Econ-
omy
This section sketches out the denition of the recursive competitive equilibrium for our
benchmark economy. To simplify notation we abstract from population and denote lower-
case variables as individual variables and upper-case variables as aggregate variables. In
our benchmark economy with news shocks, the state variables for the households are st = 
Zt; 
Z
t ; kt;Kt

or simply (Zt; Zt+1; kt;Kt) ; since next period productivity is perfectly pre-
dictable by (3) : The household's problem can be rewritten as
v

Z; Z
0
; k;K

= max
c;i;h
n
u (c; h) + E
h
v

Z
0
; Z
00
; k
0
;K
0 j Z 0io
subject to
c+ i+ 

i
k
     n  gy
2
k =

r

Z; Z
0
;K

+ 

k + w

Z; Z
0
;K

h+ (1  )l + h:
k
0
= (1  ) k + i
K
0
= (1  )K + I
logZ
0
=  logZ + Z (32)
A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a value function, v

Z; Z
0
;K

;
a set of decision rules c

Z; Z
0
; k;K

; i

Z; Z
0
; k;K

; h

Z; Z
0
; k;K

for the household; a
corresponding set of aggregate per capita decision rules, C

Z; Z
0
;K

; I

Z; Z
0
;K

;H

Z; Z
0
;K

;
a set of decision rules for the entrepreneurs,Kh

Z; Z
0
;K

; Hh

Z; Z
0
;K

; K l

Z; Z
0
;K

;
H l

Z; Z
0
;K

and factor prices functions r

Z; Z
0
;K

; w

Z; Z
0
;K

; such that these
function satises
1. The household's problem (32) ;
2. The entrepreneurs' problem (14) ;
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3. The consistency of individual and aggregate decisions, that is c

Z; Z
0
; k;K

= C

Z; Z
0
;K

;
i

Z; Z
0
; k;K

= I

Z; Z
0
;K

and h

Z; Z
0
; k;K

= H

Z; Z
0
;K

.
4. The aggregate resource constraint
C

Z; Z
0
;K

+ I

Z; Z
0
;K

+ 
0@I

Z; Z
0
;K

K
     n  gy
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
Kh

Z; Z
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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0
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 
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
Z; Z
0
;K
1 
;8

Z; Z
0
;K

:
8.2 Enforcement Constraint
The renegotiation process described here follows closely to Jermann and Quadrini (2006b).
Assume in addition to factor inputs, production of type-h project at each period requires an
amount of working capital, denoted as ft = D
 
Kht ;H
h
t

(or D
 
Kht

in the economy without
labor); which increases with the scale of the production. Working capital consists of liquid
fund that are used at the beginning of time t and are recovered at the end of time t; after
all transactions have been completed: Because this is a intra-period load , the net interest
payment is zero.
The entrepreneurs have the ability to divert the working capital and default.29 Once
default, the lender (or the representative household) can take over the control right of the
project and recover a fraction  of the future project value, denoted as V ht , which is the simply
the present discount value of the project prots from tomorrow on: Here the underlying
assumption is that only the entrepreneur has the required talent to run this project eciently.
Denote by ! the bargaining power of the entrepreneur and 1    the bargaining power of
the the lender. Bargaining is over the repayment of the debt, denoted as bft. If they reach
an agreement, the entrepreneur gets ft   bft + V ht ; and the lender get bft, If there is no
agreement, the entrepreneur gets ft and the lender gets V
i
t : Therefore, the net value for the
entrepreneur to reach an agreement is V ht   bft and the net value for lender is bft   V ht : The
bargaining problem solves:
maxbft

V ht   bft!  bft   V ht 1 !
Taking the rst order condition we get bft = [1  ! (1  )]V ht : Incentive compatibility
requires that the value of nondefault, that is V ht ; for the entrepreneur should be no less than
29Similarly, Hart and Moore (1998) assume that beyond the project cost, a fraction of the loan that the
debtor receives from the creditor represents the nonrecourse nancing, which is not seizable by the creditor.
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the value of default, that is ft   bft + V ht . Hence we have
[1  ! (1  )]V ht  ft
Denote [1  ! (1  )] as : Then we get (13) (or (1) in the model without labor).
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Figure 1: Response of Macro Aggregates to News Shock in Aggregate Technology, Economy
w/o Labor
Figure 2: Response of Aggregate TFP and its Components to News Shock on Aggregate
Technology, Economy w/o Labor
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Figure 3: Response of Macro Aggregates to News Shock in Aggregate Technology, Benchmark
Model
Figure 4: Response of Capital Reallocation to News Shock in Aggregate Technology, Bench-
mark Model
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Figure 5: Response of Aggregate TFP and its Components to News Shock on Aggregate
Technology, Benchmark Economy
Figure 6: Response of Adjusted Solow Residual and its Components to News Shock in
Aggregate Technology, Benchmark Economy
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Figure 7: Response of Macro Aggregates to News Shock to High-Tech Technology, Bench-
mark Model
Figure 8: Response of Capital Reallocation to News Shock to High-Tech Technology, Bench-
mark Model
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Figure 9: Response of Aggregate TFP and its Components to News Shocks to High-Tech
Technology, Benchmark Economy
Figure 10: Response of Adjusted Solow Residual and its Components to News Shocks to
High-Tech Technology, Benchmark Economy
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Figure 11: Volatility of Acquisition by Firms in the Top and Bottom KZ Quintiles 
